Psy 551 Learning Theory Handout on Mentalism An important concept in the analysis of the various viewpoints in psychology is mentalism. A thorough understanding of mentalism is critical because radical behaviorism is strongly opposed to mentalism. In simple terms, an orientation may be regarded as mentalistic when it holds that an appeal to internal phenomena from another dimension is necessary for a causal explanation of behavior. The internal phenomena are typically characterized as acts, states, mechanisms, processes, schema, representations, memory traces, feelings, intentions, wishes, wants, attitudes, or comparable sorts of mental or cognitive entities. Skinner has collectively referred to many of these phenomena as "explanatory fictions." A cause is from another dimension when it cannot be confirmed with the same methods of observation and analysis as its effects. In other words, the phenomena are regarded as part of a dimension that is inferred to be inside the organism in some sense, and qualitatively different from the dimension in which observable behavior takes place, rather than just a subset of that dimension. The dimension is typically referred to using such descriptors as psychic, "mental," spiritual, subjective, conceptual, hypothetical, theoretical, or cognitive. Conventional dualism, in which the mind (or some phenomenon from the nonphysical, nonmaterial dimension) is presumed to cause behavior (which is in the physical, material dimension), is probably the most common form of mentalism, but other forms are possible. Whether the other forms of mentalism successfully avoid the liabilities of dualism is a debatable question. Radical behaviorists believe many if not most forms of contemporary psychology are mentalistic by this definition. Regardless of the form, mentalism takes for granted that (a) there are these sorts of mental entities in another dimension, (b) these mental entities cause behavior, and (c) an explanation of behavior consists in specifying these entities as causally effective antecedents. Mentalists hold that the major burden of explaining why the behavior occurs, or at least why the behavior has the structure it does, consists in identifying the internal phenomena as "causally effective antecedents" for the behavior. The sense of being causally effective can take many forms. In some cases, mentalists hold that the mental entities initiate or originate the behavior. In other cases, the mental entities operate the machinery of the body to produce desired ends, and the job of psychology is to determine the nature of the machinery that is available to be operated. In still other cases, mentalists are concerned with factors or entities that underlie the behavior in question and afford "competence." By competence is meant a supposed underlying capacity that enables an organism to behave in a particular way. Regardless of how mentalists conceive of the causal relation, mentalists typically argue that an appeal to these mental phenomena is required to adequately explain at least some, and perhaps all instances of behavior. Mentalists consider an explanation of behavior to be deficient if it doesn't appeal to these sorts of mental phenomena. The appeal to the causal phenomena from another dimension can be either direct or indirect. As noted above, in traditional dualism the appeal is direct: The mind is presumed to directly cause behavior. Just how something from a nonphysical dimension ("mental") can cross a dimensional boundary and cause something in a physical dimension ("behavior") has never been established, despite centuries of debate. Another form of mentalism would be when the appeal is indirect, as when some mediating "theoretical term" or "logical construct" is cited in an explanation of behavior, and the term or construct is nothing but a surrogate for a mental cause. This version of mentalism is related to a position called "methodological behaviorism." Note that just saying "mental" words is not by itself mentalistic. Some "mental" terms may have some partial relevance to an understanding of behavior, but further analysis is necessary to determine the nature of the relevance. In any event, the relevance is not what mentalistic approaches take it to be. Where does mentalism come from? The answer is to be found in a critical examination of the history of psychology, or indeed, the intellectual history of Western culture. Radical behaviorists argue that mentalism began thousands of years ago, when individuals misinterpreted such phenomena as dreams and perception. Mentalism was then institutionalized as Western culture developed. Today, as a result of this lengthy history, mentalism is strongly entrenched in various societal and cultural institutions that are cherished in Western culture. Our religious and judicial practices are two examples of such institutions. Indeed, mentalism is the dominant viewpoint in virtually all of Western culture, and is taken for granted as a true reflection of the psychological nature of a human. Radical behaviorism rejects mentalism on a pragmatic basis. That is, radical behaviorism rejects mentalism because the entities cited in mentalism are fictions. Accordingly, they interfere with possibilities to predict and control behavior. According to mentalists, the causal internal phenomena represent an "independent contribution of the organism," which mentalists argue cannot be understood as being derived from environmental relations. Whether the phenomena should be regarded as innate or developmental or emergent is not always clear. In any case, the phenomena are typically cited as initiating causes of behavior, and the possibility of prediction and control of the behavior in question by manipulating anything in the environment is disregarded. Radical behaviorism rejects mentalism, but it does not do so because it believes (a) science should only include phenomena that are publicly observable in its theories and explanations, and (b) mentalism violates this principle by seeking to include phenomena that are unobservable. Various other forms of psychology do accept the premise that science should only include phenomena that are publicly observable in its theories and explanations, and then try to work around this restriction by appealing to mental causes as mediating "theoretical terms" or "logical constructs." As suggested earlier, this approach is called methodological behaviorism, and is the subject of a different discussion.