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Title: |
Surveillance or Punishment? A Second-Best
Theory of Pollution Regulation |
| Author: |
Oh, Youngsoo |
| Author
Affiliation: |
Kyungbook U |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Autumn 1995, v. 9, no. 3, pp. 89-101 |
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Publication Date: |
Autumn 1995 |
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Abstract: |
This paper, under the situation of
imperfectly enforceable pollution regulation, purposes to examine the
effectiveness of major policy tools for pollution emission control
through an extended emission charge model in which polluter's regulation
avoidance activity is explicitly considered as an endogenous variable.
The conclusion is that pollution regulation through an incentive system
against opportunistic polluters who are attempting to avoid the
regulation is not generally effective unless it is backed up with a high
detection probability by a strong enforcement of the regulatory agency.
In general, enforcement mechanism needs to be considered as importantly
as incentive systems in the regulation of any intended violation, i.e.,
a forceful "stick" is required to make the "carrot" be really effective. |
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