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Title: |
Deadlock in Geneva: The Battle Over Export
Subsidies in Agriculture |
| Author: |
Gaisford, James
D.; Kerr, William A. |
| Author
Affiliation: |
U Calgary; U
Saskatchewan |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Summer 2003, v. 17, no. 2, pp. 1-17 |
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Publication Date: |
Summer 2003 |
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Abstract: |
This article
provides a systematic game-theoretic analysis of retaliatory export
subsidies where each country's government is driven by political-economy
considerations. The model provides a powerful explanation of both the
grain wars of the 1980s and the difficulties facing the post-Uruguay
Round negotiations in Geneva over further reductions in agricultural
export subsidies. While an initial round of cuts in export subsidies can
be designed to confer political-economy benefits on both the US and EU
governments, subsequent reductions need not be mutually beneficial for
the two governments. The EU' s current intransigence over export
subsidies, therefore, appears to have a solid political-economy basis. |
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