Title: Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument under Uncertainty
Author: Gervais, Jean-Philippe; Lapan, Harvey E.
Author Affiliation: Laval U; IA State U
Source: International Economic Journal, Winter 2002, v. 16, no. 4, pp. 75-96
Publication Date: Winter 2002
Abstract: This paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges; i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks.

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