Title: Equilibrium Contracts in a Bilateral Monopoly with Unequal Bargaining Powers
Author: Dasgupta, Siddhartha; Devadoss, Stephen
Author Affiliation: U AR, Pine Bluff; U ID
Source: International Economic Journal, Spring 2002, v. 16, no. 1, pp. 43-71
Publication Date: Spring 2002
Abstract: Real-world bilateral monopolies often indicate that one party exercises slightly superior bargaining power than the other party. We analyze long-term, cooperative contracts in bilateral monopolies with unequal bargaining powers. We assume that the two parties bargain for a determinate price and quantity of the intermediate product by optimizing a joint objective which takes into account the profits and bargaining power of each party. We use a Bowley price leadership model to develop the multi-period contracts and derive conditions that induce a Nash equilibrium at the jointly determined points of operation.

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