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Title: |
A Coalition-Form Analysis of the "One
Country-One Vote" Rule in the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank |
| Author: |
Bindseil,
Ulrich |
| Author
Affiliation: |
European
Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Spring 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 141-164 |
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Publication Date: |
Spring 2001 |
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Abstract: |
This paper analyses the "one country-one
vote" rule for monetary policy decision making of the Governing Council
of the European Central Bank in a framework of cooperative game theory.
The Shapley value is used as a solution concept. In contrast to former
papers analysing the allocation of abstract "voting power" in committees
of international organisations, preferences for monetary policy are
modelled to obtain a prediction about potential transfers implied by an
equal allocation of voting rights when countries are of different size.
It is shown that if the number of countries participating to a currency
union grows and the weight of the largest country within the currency
union becomes small, the allocation of voting rights becomes irrelevant
in the sense that transfers per country tend in any case to zero. |
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