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Title: |
The Role of GATT in Trade Negotiations: A
Game-Theoretic Perspective |
| Author: |
Kim, Gi-Hong |
| Author
Affiliation: |
Korea Institute for Industrial Econ & Trade |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Winter 2000, v. 14, no. 4, pp. 103-123 |
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Publication Date: |
Winter 2000 |
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Abstract: |
The purpose of this paper is to explain
theoretically the role of GATT in tariff negotiations, without narrowly
interpreting GATT as an agreement. This paper, which establishes a game
model where two nations are involved in tariff negotiations, shows the
following points. First, free trade is difficult to realize even in a
world with complete information. Second, GATT can serve as a mechanism
for nations to find a particular cooperative tariff under incomplete
information. Third, gradual tariff reduction can be explained as the
interaction between the gradual decline of domestic political pressure
and multilateral tariff negotiations under GATT. |
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