Title: On the Dynamic Incentive of Price-Quality Differentiation by a Monopolist Firm
Author: Wang, Gyu Ho
Author Affiliation: Chung-Ang U
Source: International Economic Journal, Spring 2000, v. 14, no. 1, pp. 33-45
Publication Date: Spring 2000
Abstract: When consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences about the quality of a product, a monopolist firm can take advantage of this heterogeneity, thereby, increase the profit by offering different price-quality pairs. This business practice is called the second degree price discrimination or non-linear pricing. This paper extends the static non-linear pricing problem into the dynamic one where the monopolist firm cannot precommit in advance. The main result is that the dynamic non-linear pricing outcome is the same as the static non-linear pricing outcome so that additional opportunities to transact neither benefits nor hurts the monopolist firm.

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