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Title: |
Two and One Sided Conflict: Effectiveness and
Scale in a Ratio Form of Conflict Technology |
| Author: |
Noh, Suk Jae |
| Author
Affiliation: |
Hallym U |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Winter 1999, v. 13, no. 4, pp. 101-118 |
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Publication Date: |
Winter 1999 |
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Abstract: |
This paper investigates how resources are
allocated in the conflict when the conflict technology is given by a
ratio form that has both effectiveness and scale parameters. The
analysis shows that the "paradox of power" as identified by Hirshleifer
(1991) is not a general result in the equilibrium of a conflict. In the
interior solution of two-sided conflict, it is shown that, as resource
disparity increases, the less endowed agent becomes more aggressive by
allocating a larger fraction of resources to offense and smaller
fractions both to defense and production. As offense becomes more
effective, the less endowed agent allocates a larger fraction of his
resources to offense. However, as scale effect becomes larger, he
allocates more resources to offense only when offense is not relatively
too ineffective. In the Nash interior solution of one sided conflict,
when offense becomes more effective, the ratio of offense to defense
decreases but this reduces the fraction the prey retains of his produced
output. However, when scale effect becomes larger, the prey retains a
smaller portion of his produced output with a smaller ratio of offense
to defense only when offense is sufficiently more effective relative to
defense. |
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