Title: R&D Spillovers, Technology Cartel, and Monopoly Regulation
Author: Lee, Sang-Ho
Author Affiliation: Chonnam U
Source: International Economic Journal, Autumn 1998, v. 12, no. 3, pp. 77-88
Publication Date: Autumn 1998
Abstract: In the presence of R&D spillovers, this paper analyzes the regulated firms' R&D performances according to their noncooperative or cooperative R&D activities. First, it analyzes the R&D equilibrium in local (natural) monopolies, examines its welfare effects, and finds some relationship between output regulation and R&D performance. Next, it proposes an optimal R&D subsidy mechanism that induces regulated firms to implement the social optimum, and discusses about the regulatory R&D subsidies policy.

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