Title: Foreign Direct Investment as a Commitment Mechanism in the Presence of Managed Trade
Author: Aizenman, Joshua
Author Affiliation: Dartmouth College and NBER
Source: International Economic Journal, Winter 1996, v. 10, no. 4, pp. 1-28
Publication Date: Winter 1996
Abstract: This paper evaluates the degree to which the threat of managed trade leased to foreign direct investment (FDI) in a time-consistent manner. An endogenous switch from free to managed trade may occur ex-post as the outcome of a sequential game. We identify time-inconsistent patterns of managed trade in the absence of capital mobility. We demonstrate that FDI alleviates this time inconsistency by reducing the ex-post incentive of one country to switch to managed trade. FDI induced by the threat of managed trade benefits ex-ante both the host country and the multinationals, explaining the relative tolerance toward FDI.

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