Title: Targeted Tariff Protection, Monopolistic Competition and Demand Interdependence
Author: Lin, Hwan C.
Author Affiliation: U NC, Charlotte
Source: International Economic Journal, Summer 1996, v. 10, no. 2, pp. 25-49
Publication Date: Summer 1996
Abstract: This paper examines how the welfare effects of tariff protection, either targeted or across-the-board, are dependent critically upon alternative patterns of demand linkages among several goods from monopolistically competitive sectors. It shows that when complementary possibilities are present, tariff protection may harm the import-complementing sector more than it assists the import-substituting sector, thereby aggravating consumption distortions and reducing national welfare. It also shows that across-the-board protection is much less feasible than is targeted protection because the former requires much more informational details of both demand linkages among noncompetitive markets and economic structure.

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