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Title: |
Are Prohibitive Trade Sanctions Optimal? |
| Author: |
Gaisford, James
D.; Sood, Sharad |
| Author
Affiliation: |
U Calgary |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Spring 1996, v. 10, no. 1, pp. 1-20 |
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Publication Date: |
Spring 1996 |
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Abstract: |
Optimal trade sanctions will typically be
nonprohibitive. The maximum penalty of a total trade embargo may not be
desired or warranted and nonprohibitive sanctions may strike the best
balance between punishing the target and avoiding damage to the
sanctioner. Nonprohibitive sanctions can also: reduce smuggling, lessen
the benefits to bystander countries, and mitigate the harm to innocent
communities within the target country. When there are domestic
distortions within the target country, nonprohibitive sanctions may be
more painful than prohibitive sanctions. The possibility of easing
nonprohibitive sanctions in response to reform also provides an
appropriate incentive. |
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