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Title: |
Power Structure and Rent Competition |
| Author: |
Hong, Yoo Soo |
| Author
Affiliation: |
OK State U |
| Source: |
International Economic Journal, Winter 1987, v. 1, no. 4, pp. 45-60 |
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Publication Date: |
Winter 1987 |
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Abstract: |
This paper presents a model of rent
competition in a mixed economic system in which wealth maximizing
interest group coalitions share wealth according to their relative
political power. The model solves for optimal lobbying expenditures of a
producer group, a consumer group, and individual firms. The existence of
monopolistic rent is not presupposed. Instead, the equilibrium market
price, output, and market shares of firms are determined endogenously.
As a result, the distribution of rent depends upon the relative
political power of each interest group coalition and total lobbying
expensiture decreases as the asymmetry in marginal political power among
interst group coalition increases. |
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